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1 Introduction
The structure of wages and compensation in the United States changed substantially over
the 1980s and 1990s. Firms increased their use of performance-related pay, such as piece
rates, bonuses, and stock options, to provide incentives. Simultaneously, earnings inequality,
returns to skill, and compensation at the top of the distribution increased substantially; job
mobility was also higher, although only for certain groups of workers. These changes aﬀected
executives at the top of the earnings distribution along with workers in general.1 In spite
of the extensive literature on changes in inequality and job mobility, and the discussions
on why there has been an increase in CEO pay, little is known about the reasons for the
dramatic changes in compensation structures and incentive provision. What are the driving
forces behind these trends?2
In this paper, we argue that a major force behind many of these changes is the increase
in foreign competition resulting from reductions in trade barriers and the globalization of
economic activity. Foreign competition, and globalization more generally, can have an im-
pact on incentive structures to the extent that they make product markets more competitive
(Tybout, 2003). Higher imports, changes in entry barriers, lower costs of transport, and in-
formation diﬀusion all tend to increase the degree of competition that firms face; therefore,
they should indirectly aﬀect the provision of incentives by firms (Hermalin, 1992; Schmidt,
1997; Raith, 2004). We proceed here with an empirical assessment of the extent to which
changes in foreign competition, measured as the degree of import penetration faced by U.S.
firms from 1992 to 2000, aﬀected how they provided incentives.
The variation in import competition over time and across industries allows us to clearly
identify one of the channels through which globalization aﬀects the working of firms. We
1Murphy (1999) surveys the evidence on the increase in total pay and performance-pay sensitivities for
executives. Lemieux et al. (2005) show that the use of bonus and incentive contracts increased in the
United States not only for executives but also for workers. Frydman (2005) provides further evidence of the
evolution of pay and finds that inequality among executives increased, CEO pay went up, and job mobility
was higher in the 1980s and 1990s than in earlier decades. Katz and Autor (1999) survey the evidence on
changes in inequality and returns to skill.
2Murphy and Zabojnik (2004 a and b) and Frydman (2005) claim that the increase in CEO pay is due
to higher demand for general skills. Similarly, Gabaix and Landier (2006) argue that the existence of bigger
and more integrated firms has increased the impact of CEO skills and therefore boosted their compensation.
Competition can be thought of as an additional explanation that also could explain why the demand for
general skills may have increased. Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that it is due to an increase in rent
extraction on the part of managers, camouflaged as incentive provision, although reason why the incentives
to extract rents from the firm have changed is unclear.
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assess how firms in diﬀerent industries, with diﬀerent evolutions in their trade exposure,
changed their incentive structures during the 1990s in the U.S.3 In addition to showing the
overall eﬀect, and in order to isolate fluctuations in foreign competition that are exogenous
to the incentive policies of firms and uncorrelated with potential omitted variables, we use
import tariﬀs and exchange rates as instruments.4 Tariﬀs and exchange rates provide a
compelling source of variation, because their evolution diﬀers across sectors throughout the
study period, and they are arguably exogenous to current executive employment. The use
of instrumental variables allows us to provide a precise causal eﬀect, that is possibly a lower
bound for the overall eﬀect of the changes in competition.
While we restrict the impact of globalization to its eﬀect via import penetration, we
try to be as comprehensive as possible in the definition of incentives. Incentives to exert
eﬀort and to improve the manager´s total contribution to the productivity of the firm
can be provided in several ways. Some are explicit and contractual such as agreeing on
a bonus or a performance-related pay scheme. Others are implicit (without an explicit
written contract) and enforced on the basis of commitment and reputation. These include
discretionary bonuses or the commitment of the firm to a given promotion scheme. Finally,
some incentives may not be provided directly by firms but rather are implicit in labor
market conditions (e.g. the good performance of one executive in a given firm may lead
another firm to oﬀer this same executive a better job).5 To provide a comprehensive view
of the provision of incentives inside firms, we relate changes in foreign competition to a
number of measures; the incentives may be provided through explicit contracts or implicit
agreements, through direct rewards on contemporaneous performance or indirect ones based
on promotions, and via turnover or career concerns in general.
Even though executives are only a subsample of the general employed population, they
have some characteristics that make them an ideal study group for answering some of the
questions we are interested in. First, the availability of data on executive compensation
allows us to perform a detailed analysis of wages and promotions. We use a matched
employer-employee panel dataset (Execucomp) with five executives per firm. It contains
3We are able to compute the level of import penetration faced by the firm itself by taking into account
the fact that it may have products in diﬀerent four-digit SIC industries.
4Exchange rates (import tariﬀs) are weighted by the relative importance of each currency (trading part-
ner) in total industry imports, so that there is diﬀerential variation across industries in a given period. We
then construct firm-specific measures, according to the industries in which the firm operates.
5See Gibbons (2005) and Gibbons and Waldman (1999) for a broad survey of theoretical and empirical
results on the diﬀerent channels for incentive provision.
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very detailed information on both firm and employment characteristics, providing a fairly
comprehensive picture of internal labor markets and incentive provision. One can track
executives as the extent of foreign competition faced by the firm evolves, and evaluate how
incentives change over time and across industries. The richness of the data allows us to
look at a variety of measures that capture incentives, including: 1) fixed and variable pay;
2) within-firm wage inequality and promotion ladders; and 3) turnover. We are also able to
assess whether firms seek to hire more "able" or "talented" CEOs and executives as foreign
competition changes. These measures taken together give us a comprehensive view of the
provision of incentives.
Second, this particular group of workers allows us to better identify the eﬀect of changes
in foreign competition on firm contracting behavior, independent of its eﬀects on labor
markets. This is because the boundaries of labor and product markets are relatively inde-
pendent when it comes to executives, who more frequently change firms between industries
rather than within industries.6 Moreover, collective bargaining is virtually non-existent
among executives. Therefore, it is unlikely that individual executives internalize the eﬀect
of their joint compensation packages on firm profits. Thus, by concentrating on executives,
we are able to isolate the eﬀects that come mostly from product market competition.7
Finally, even though executives constitute a very specific subset of highly skilled workers,
comparing our results on executives with existing results on the general labor force may
shed some light on how foreign competition aﬀects high- versus and low-skilled workers.
Our results show that higher foreign competition reduces the level of fixed pay and
increases the sensitivity of pay to performance. At the same time, it increases the steepness
of the promotion ladder and pay inequality within a firm. Higher competition also is
associated with higher job turnover, although the causality of this last result is less clear.
All of these results suggest that with more competition, firms provide more incentives
to executives. Finally, we assess whether the increase in job mobility is associated with
firms hiring more "talented" managers. We identify "ability" or "talent" (the permanent
unobserved component of wages) from the estimated individual fixed eﬀects and find that,
as foreign competition increases, firms hire more "talented" CEOs.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the positive relationship between wage
6For example, 71% of the transitions of executives between firms included in Execucomp are between
sectors when they are defined at a 4-digit SIC code level (64% when defined at a 3-digit level).
7As a reference, the median compensation of an executive in Execucomp represents 0.1% of the median
firm revenue.
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inequality and trade openness. We show that foreign competition may aﬀect the provision
of incentives within firms in two ways that raise inequality: by increasing wage dispersion
within firms; and, through the use of performance-related pay. This is important because
most of the mechanisms explored to link inequality and trade have failed to fully account
for the overall positive correlation, including the eﬀects of openness on total labor supply,
total labor demand, skill-biased labor demand, and institutions (Slaughter, 1999). Here we
suggest an additional mechanism.8
The rest of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, we present the general structure of the
paper and the related literature; Section 3 presents the data used in the empirical sections;
Section 4.1 shows the specification and the results relative to fixed and variable pay; Section
4.2 presents the results on promotion ladders and turnover; Section 4.4 explores how firms
reward talent diﬀerently according to the degree of foreign competition; and Section 5
provides an overall picture and concludes.
2 Background and Related Literature
The growth of foreign competition, and globalization more generally, implies that firms
are increasingly exposed to competitive pressure. An increase in import penetration in
an industry means that domestic firms are facing more competition because foreign firms
have a bigger presence in the market. Furthermore, changes in foreign competition can
permanently reshape the general competitive configuration of an industry; that is, if there
are some fixed entry costs, once foreign firms decide to enter the market, they are unlikely
to exit.9 Therefore, one can think of the increase in foreign competition as an increase in
competitive pressure for the industry.
The eﬀect of competition on incentive provision within the principal-agent framework
has been studied in a number of papers (Schmidt, 1997; Raith, 2003; Vives, 2004). A
general result of virtually all competition models is that, with more competition, the residual
demand that a firm faces becomes more elastic and shifts down.10 This generates two
counteracting eﬀects in terms of incentives: on the one hand, more competition raises
the reward to market stealing activities due to the additional elasticity of substitution.
8Lemieux et al (2005) empirically establish the link between the growing use of performance-related pay
and the increase in wage inequality in the U.S. between the 1970s and 1990s.
9See Baldwin (1988), Dixit (1989) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989)
10See Vives (2004) and Boone (2000) for an overview on these two eﬀects.
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This implies a higher marginal return to managerial and workers’ eﬀort that leads firms
to introduce steeper incentive packages. On the other hand, the residual demand that a
firm faces shrinks, shifting the profit function downwards, and making market stealing less
attractive. This leads the firm to reduce the steepness of its incentive contracts.11 Overall,
the total eﬀect of competition on incentive pay is theoretically ambiguous, which makes this
an interesting empirical question.12
One related eﬀect is that executives face an implicit incentive when competition in-
creases the risk of the firm going bankrupt. Schmidt (1997) explicitly models this incentive,
and several empirical papers (Nickell, 1996; Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz, 2002) show em-
pirically that if additional competition leads to more pressure on profits, employees tend
to work harder. If an increase in foreign competition indeed reduces profits, then this
would implicitly discipline workers, thus reducing the need for the firm to provide explicit
incentives.
An increase in competition also may increase the available information about market
conditions and help firms to elicit the contribution of an executive to profits (Hart, 1983;
Scharfstein, 1988; and Hermalin, 1992). This may lead to a change in the steepness of in-
centive schemes, and more generally to increased use of relative-performance evaluation.
However, in this literature the overall predicted eﬀect on the relationship between compe-
tition and incentives is also ambiguous.
Our analysis asks what is the net eﬀect that dominates empirically for various ways in
which firms provide incentives. We explicitly study the sensitivity of pay to performance
(Section 4.1), the returns to a promotion in the firms’ wage ladder (Section 4.2) and turnover
probabilities (Section 4.4).
To the extent that firms can increase performance (cut marginal costs of production)
either by increasing the eﬀort exerted or by hiring a more skilled/talented manager, many of
the arguments for rewarding managerial eﬀort are also valid for rewarding skill (Guadalupe,
2004) and managerial talent. Marin and Verdier (2003) present a model in which globaliza-
tion aﬀects the hierarchical structure of the firm and the reward for talent. Firms change
their hierarchical structure, and thus the explicit and implicit incentives that executives
11Raith (2003) allows for free entry and exit of firms so that firm profits are constant and his second eﬀect
is not present.
12Cuñat and Guadalupe (2004) and (2005) find evidence that competition, measured as deregulation
in the U.S. financial services and a sharp appreciation in the U.K., respectively, raised performance-pay
sensitivities.
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face, and increase their demand for talented CEOs.13 In this paper, we analyze the empir-
ical eﬀect of competition on both firm hierarchies (section 4.2) and the reward for talent
(section 4.3).
The present paper is related to several others that associate foreign competition with
various labor market outcomes. Revenga (1992) relates micro-data on unemployment and
wages to import penetration at the sector level; she finds that increased foreign competition
led to higher unemployment and lower wages over the 1977-1987 period. Bertrand (2004)
shows that for the average U.S. worker, implicit contracts are replaced by spot contracting as
competition increases. She analyzes how the relationship between wages and unemployment
at the sector level is aﬀected by import penetration. She finds that the more competitive
the industry is, the more salaries are responsive to current rather than past unemployment
rates.
In two related papers, Abowd and Lemieux (1992) and Abowd and Allain (1996) find
that the elasticity of salaries to firms’ quasi-rents increases when the latter are instrumented
using shocks to foreign competition. The underlying idea behind these two articles is that
foreign competition modifies the labor market conditions of an industry in that it alters
the rents available to be split, the outside options of employees, and the bargaining power
of the parties.14 Therefore, foreign competition aﬀects bargaining conditions and labor
market institutions. Our article departs from this perspective because, by concentrating on
executives, labor market considerations and changes to labor market institutions are less
likely to play a role, while issues related to product market competition and governance
may be more relevant.
We also depart from the papers mentioned above because we study changes in the
structure of compensation within firms (not just pay levels), changes in the structure of
hierarchies, executive turnover, and the demand for talent. We also extend the identification
strategy in Revenga (1992) and Bertrand (2004) by using tariﬀs as an additional instrument
of import penetration and by calculating firm-specific import penetration, exchange rates,
and tariﬀs.15
13The eﬀects of competition and globalization on hierarchies are the subject of a growing literature (Antras
et al., 2006; Rajan and Wulf, 2006).
14See also Kramarz (2006)
15An argument, related to ours, relative to globalization and pay can be found in Feenstra and Hanson





We use the Standard&Poor’s Execucomp dataset. This is a panel (starting in 1992) of all
firms in the S&P 1500 index.16 Each firm reports detailed yearly information on the pay
structure of the five most highly paid executives in the firm (ranked by salary and bonus)
as well as some individual characteristics. The data also contain information from financial
statements on firm characteristics and performance. For our purposes, one unique feature of
this data is that it allows us to follow firms and executives over time, in a panel setting. We
use yearly data from 1992 to 1999 for all manufacturing sectors. The data start in 1992, and
1999 is the last year for which we are able to compute import penetration. Manufacturing is
the sector for which we have trade data. This leaves us with 737 firms and 6,325 executives
(23,222 unique observations).
From this data, we obtain for each executive in the sample a comprehensive measure of
total yearly compensation, including the components of pay that are related to performance
and those that are not (in particular, we are able to include stock options and long-term
incentive plans (Murphy, 1999)). This is the natural logarithm of the sum of salary, bonus,
total value of stock options granted (valued using the standard Black-Scholes formula), total
value of restricted stock granted, long-term incentive payouts and other annual compensa-
tion.17 We also define and use the logarithm of salary-plus-bonus.
3.2 Discussion of Foreign Competition and its Instruments: Identification
The data analysis in the next section evaluates the eﬀect of foreign competition on firm f
in industry j at time t (impfjt) on a number of aspects of compensation and incentives, for
each individual i. We run regressions of the form:
ln(Wifjt) = α+ γ1impfjt + impfjt ∗X 0ifjtγ2 +X 0ifjtγ3 + z0ifjtβ + uifjt (1)
whereWifjt is total compensation, z0ifjt are control variables such as firm size or industry
dummies. We evaluate the eﬀect of import penetration impfjt and eventually its interaction
16The index includes firms in the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 indices, so it
represents a stratified sample of listed firms of all sizes.
17Execucomp variable TDC1.
8
with some variables Xifjt,18 and allow for diﬀerent specifications of the error term uifjt (see
each individual model below).
The measure of import penetration impfjt used in what follows is defined at the firm
level, and takes into account that one firm may operate in diﬀerent industries. To derive this
firm-specific measure of import penetration, we first define industry-level import penetration
(at 4-digit SIC) as imports divided by the total value of internal production plus imports.
This measures the extent to which foreign competitors penetrate the local market. For
each industry, we average the current and one-forward-lag import penetration, and take its
deviation with respect to the industry mean. Taking the deviation and including industry
dummies in all the regressions ensures that in cγ1 or cγ2 we do not capture unobserved
diﬀerences by industry that are correlated with import penetration.
We exploit the variation in import penetration across industries. Over the sample period,
average import penetration goes from 0.16 to 0.21, but it increases for some sectors and
decreases for others such that, in a given year, we may find a rich combination of changes for
diﬀerent sectors. As an example, Figure 1 shows this variation for three selected industries.
Since many firms sell goods in more than one industry, import penetration into the firm’s
main industry may be a misleading measure of the actual import penetration that the firm
faces. To account for this, we define a firm-specific import penetration measure, impfjt,
as the weighted average of the industry-level import penetration (computed as above) that
the firm faces in all of the industries in which it operates. The weights are constructed as
the fraction of total sales associated with each SIC4 industry in which the firm operates
(declared business segments from Compustat Segments data). Because the industries the
firm operates in may change endogenously over time, the weights used correspond to the
firm’s operations in 1991. Here the identification arises from import penetration changing
within a firm over time. The advantage of this choice is that it is immune to endogenous
production decisions; the disadvantage is that, by the end of the sample (1999), and given
the fixed 1991 weights, variations in this measure may not be highly correlated with the
actual import penetration that the firm faces in a particular year. We ran all of the specifi-
cations using the industry-based measure,19 and our results were qualitatively very similar
to the ones using the firm-based variable. Since the latter is a better measure of the degree
of import competition the firm actually faces, and because it is not subject to endogenous
18These depend on the outcome of interest. It can be firm performance (Section 4.1) or hierarchical level
(Sections 4.2 and 4.3).
19Where each firm is assigned the import penetration of its primary SIC4 code.
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changes of industry of operation, we only show the results using this measure.20
However rich the variation of import penetration is in the panel, its use still can be
subject to a number of criticisms in terms of possible endogeneity problems. These prob-
lems either could be the result of reverse causality or omitted explanatory variables that
aﬀect both pay policies and import penetration. To deal with this, we use an instrumen-
tal variables approach that isolates the causal eﬀect of import penetration by focusing on
exogenous variation in imports.
One can think of a number of potential endogeneity problems in the non-instrumented
regressions. For example, in terms of reverse causality, one could argue that changes in
compensation structure may drive the behavior of executives and, therefore, the degree of
competition in the market (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999) and the extent to which foreign
firms enter. This problem should be solved by using instruments that are correlated with
import penetration and exogenous to the firm´s pay policies.
Second, there may be omitted variables that are correlated with import penetration and
not captured by the controls, such as exports or other dimensions of trade, variables related
to rent-extraction, and general demand shocks. The endogeneity problems associated with
exports or other trade variables might be important if we used aggregate imports as our
explanatory variable. Using firm-specific import penetration and instruments instead deals
with the correlation between imports and other trade variables (we discuss this further later
in the paper).
The rent-extraction argument (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005; Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2001) says that the change in incentives can be driven by rent extraction, camouflaged in
the variable component of pay, so that executives appear to get paid for luck. However, an
increase in competition tends to increase transparency and lower the availability of rents (it
is a "bad luck" shock in Bertrand and Mullainathan); we would therefore expect that the
extent of rent extraction via camouflage is lower, but we find the opposite. If present, the
rent-extraction mechanism actually would tend to reduce the size of our incentive-related
coeﬃcients, thus pushing our results downwards. A similar argument can be made with
respect to demand shocks. A positive shock to domestic demand in a given sector would
increase local production and imports and, at the same time, could aﬀect the pay policies
of the firms. However, the sign of this eﬀect in terms of import penetration is unclear, and
20The results are not substantially diﬀerent if we use "running" firm-specific weights (where the weights
vary as the firm changes its product mix). However, since product mix is endogenous, we favor the fixed-
weight measure.
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likely to be sector-specific. Instrumental variables also address this concern.
Finally, it is possible that to some extent, import fluctuations are foreseen by firms and
anticipated, so changes observed in a given year under-estimate the actual reaction. And
import penetration indeed may be measured with error, thus leading to attenuation bias.
For all of the reasons listed above, the eﬀect of import penetration on our measures
of compensation and incentives might be underestimated, and therefore the results biased
towards zero. To deal with these endogeneity concerns, and in order to evaluate the eﬀect
of purely exogenous fluctuations in import penetration, we provide instrumental variables
results.
The first instrument used follows Bertrand (2004), who constructs a measure of industry-
specific import-weighted exchange rates. The weights on the bilateral exchange rates be-
tween the U.S. and its trading partners are the average proportion in total imports from
each country in the years 1990 and 1991. The weighted exchange rates are recalculated at
the firm-level using the weights from the Compustat segments data, as we did with the im-
port penetration measure. This instrument is arguably exogenous because exchange rates
are determined in international financial markets and therefore are uncorrelated with firms’
compensation policy. By choosing static weights, we avoid any possible endogeneity that
could arise from the joint determination of the weights and exchange rates. We use both
current and one-lag exchange rates.
Using firm-specific exchange rates has two important advantages. First, diﬀerent cur-
rency mixes across industries and firms imply that, in any given year, one firm may be
subject to an appreciation while another may be subject to a depreciation. This allows for
richer variation in instrumented import penetration than if we were using a single exchange
rate for all sectors. Second, using static import weights increases the explanatory power of
exchange rates for imports and reduces their explanatory power for potential confounding
factors, thus reinforcing the exclusion restriction. For example, import-weighted exchange
rates are poorly related to exports, so our instrumented regressions are not capturing an
indirect eﬀect of exchange rates through changes in exports.
As a second instrument, we use import tariﬀs faced by firms wanting to enter the U.S.
market. Tariﬀ data come from the UNCTAD TRAINS dataset. We define the average
tariﬀ of a particular industry as the weighted average of tariﬀs set by the U.S. on imports
from each country. To avoid endogeneity, the weights are the proportion of imports from
each country measured in the dataset’s base year (1993). Then we calculate the firm-specific
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tariﬀ using segments data and use one-year lag of the tariﬀ measure. Again, this is arguably
exogenous because tariﬀs are determined either at trade negotiation rounds (WTO) or by
federal policy, and thus independent of firm’s compensation policies and incentives. Indeed,
most of our tariﬀ variation is around 1995, when the Uruguay round was implemented. It
is also not obvious that there is a channel through which changes in tariﬀs facing foreign
firms will aﬀect the employment policy of domestic firms via something other than imports.
Since tariﬀ data is available only from 1993 onwards, and because we use lagged tariﬀs, our
instrumented regressions eﬀectively cover the period 1994-1999.
All of the tariﬀ and trade information comes from the NBER database21 and the UNC-
TAD TRAINS dataset. Total production at the industry level comes from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis Industry Shipments data. Further details of all the variables and their
construction can be found in the appendix.
One implicit maintained assumption (the exclusion restriction) is that the instruments
only have an eﬀect on the dependent variable through import penetration. To evaluate this,
we regress export openness (that is, exports over total production at 4-digit SIC, demeaned
by industry) at the industry-level on our three instrumental variables in a regression that
controls for year and industry dummies. We find that they have no explanatory power,
which lends some support to the exclusion restriction (see Column 4 of Table 2).
For each of our specifications, we provide two-stage least-squares estimates of equation
1, where impfjt and impfjt ∗ Xifjt are instrumented with the source-weighted exchange
rate (current and lagged), lagged tariﬀs for industry j in year t, and the interaction of these
terms with the relevant Xifjt variables (as in Bertrand, 2004).
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the basic first-stage underlying the paper; it regresses import
penetration on current exchange rate, lagged exchange rate, and lagged tariﬀs. Import
penetration and the instruments are defined by firm using the business segments weights.
The eﬀect of exchange rates and tariﬀs is highly significant. The results with respect to the
exchange rate indicate that depreciation of the dollar by one standard deviation would lead
to a 2 percentage point increase in import penetration after one-year lag; i.e. a full standard
deviation (the contemporaneous eﬀect is smaller, just half a percentage point). The eﬀect of
tariﬀs is smaller but highly significant and has the expected sign, with lower tariﬀs leading
to increases in import penetration (one standard deviation increase in tariﬀs leads to a 0.8
21"US Imports, Exports and Tariﬀ Data, 1989-2001 (NBER 9387)". See Feenstra et al (2002) for a detailed
description of the construction of each of these variables.
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percentage points fall in import penetration, or a fall of a third of a standard deviation).
The joint significance of all the instruments and control variables is quite high, with an R2
around 30%. Moreover, the additional R2 explained by the instrumental variables excluded
in the second stage (exchange rate, lagged exchange rate, and lagged tariﬀs) is around
5%. The test of the excluded instruments shows that their joint explanatory power is
statistically significant. Because we have 3 instruments, we test for overidentification in all
the regressions and cannot reject the null, that they are valid instruments (uncorrelated
with the error and therefore excluded correctly from the regression). The second-stage
results were similar if we only used tariﬀs or exchange rates; this lends further credibility
to the instrumental variables. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 show the first stage of the first
specification in the paper, which includes performance as one of the regressors, with similar
results. Whenever imports is interacted with other variables Xifjt in a specification, that
interaction is instrumented with the instruments and their interaction with Xifjt in a two-
stage least-squares setting, as in Bertrand (2004).
It is important to emphasize that even though globalization is a pervasive trend, the
eﬀect identified here is deliberately much narrower than the overall trend, so we can confi-
dently say something about causality. To avoid capturing a spurious trend, we exploit the
panel, where import penetration varies in diﬀerent directions in diﬀerent industries (and
firms), and we include year and industry dummies in all the regressions. Furthermore,
the instrumental variables results capture changes in the structure of compensation as a
response to unexpected shocks —which by their nature are not spurious— to import penetra-
tion. Focusing on this narrow channel has the advantage that we know where the variation
is coming from, and it provides a clear channel for the eﬀect. The cost of this strategy is
that globalization may operate through various other channels, and our results may be a
lower bound of the overall eﬀect of globalization on compensation structures.
4 Results
4.1 Pay Structure
Executive pay has a fixed component and a component that is related to performance. As
mentioned earlier, in the 1980s and 1990s, the proportion of the variable component in total
pay and the sensitivity of pay to performance increased. Here we assess the eﬀect of foreign
competition on this trend.
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Total compensation for each executive i in firm f , in industry j, in year t, can be written
as ln(Wifjt) = Aifjt + Bifjt(Perf fjt) +
P
δsXsifjt + dt + dj + ηi + ifjt. where X
s
ifjt are
other determinants of the structure of pay; dt and dj are time and industry dummies; ηi are
individual fixed eﬀects; and ifjt is a white noise. That is, the logarithm of compensation,
ln(Wifjt), contains a fixed component, Aifjt, and a variable component, Bifjt(Perf fjt), that
is a function of firm performance (measured as the logarithm of shareholder’s value). Both
elements can vary across individuals, firms, and industries. We specify:
Aifjt = a0 + a1impfjt ; Bfjt = b0 + b1impfjt
where the term impfjt is a measure of import penetration (by firm). The reduced-form
specification that we estimate is therefore:
ln(Wifjt) = a0+a1impfjt+b0Perf fjt+b1impjtPerf fjt+
X
asXsifjt+dt+dj+ηi+ifjt (2)
The main coeﬃcients of interest are a1, which measures the eﬀect of foreign competition on
the fixed component of pay, and b1, which captures the diﬀerential slope of the performance-
related-pay agreement with respect to diﬀerent levels of import penetration.
The compensation measure that we use is the log of total pay, and the performance
measure is the log of shareholders’ value22, so the sensitivity estimates can be interpreted
conveniently as elasticities.
Foreign competition, measured as described in the previous section, is demeaned such
that bb1 does not capture any unobserved cross-sectional diﬀerences at the sector level that
could be correlated with compensation. Controls for firm size (logarithm of assets), year
dummies, industry dummies, and a CEO dummy —in the regressions that pool all executives—
23, are included in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-year level in the
regressions where we pool all executives.
Columns 1 to 7 of Table 3 show the OLS estimates of this specification. Increases in
import penetration are associated with a lower fixed component of pay (bb0 < 0) and a
variable component of pay that is more sensitive to firm performance (bb1 > 0). Columns
22This specification is similar to the ones in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Murphy (1986) among
others. Given that we estimate a fixed-eﬀects specification, it is equivalent to regressing the change in log
total pay against the change in shareholders’ value, as is frequently done in the corporate finance literature.
23Unfortunately, there is only limited biographical information about the executives in the data. Data
items such as gender, age, or tenure are only available for a subset of individuals. The fixed-eﬀect regression
will capture gender, education, and other time-invariant characteristics, but there is little we can do about
the time-varying variables like tenure.
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1 to 5 pool all executives while columns 6 and 7 restrict the analysis to company CEOs.
Columns 4, 5, and 7 control for time variation in the slope of compensation by interacting
time dummies (3 time periods are defined: 1992-1994, 1995-1997, and 1998-2000) with the
performance measure, and also allowing for diﬀerential slopes across industries (interacting
industry dummies with performance).
The eﬀect of import penetration is sizeable. For all executives (Column 2), a 1 percentage
point increase in import penetration (one half of a standard deviation) generates an average
drop in fixed pay of 6.6 percent and an increase of 1 percent in the sensitivity of pay to
performance. Compared with an average sensitivity of 24% the additional percenctage
point implies an increase of 4% in performance-related pay. For CEOs only (Column 5),
the changes are similar and correspond to a 6 percent fall in pay and a 1 percentage point
increase in the sensitivity of pay to performance. The magnitudes are very similar (not
statistically diﬀerent) when we look at "stayers" (by including firm-specific individual fixed
eﬀects, in Column 3), which indicates that the eﬀect we are capturing operates mostly within
firms and is not the result of individuals changing between firms with diﬀerent compensation
structures. The results are also similar, although somewhat smaller in magnitude, when we
saturate the model allowing for time trends and permanent cross-industry diﬀerences in the
slope (Column 4).
Because potential endogeneity is always a concern in these regressions, either because
diﬀerent pay structures lead to management strategies that may preempt foreign competi-
tion or because both may be co-determined by some omitted variable, we go on to provide
instrumental variable results in Table 4. The instruments are the weighted real exchange
rate of the dollar (current and lagged) and the lagged tariﬀ.
The eﬀect of a 1 percentage point increase (half a standard deviation) in import penetra-
tion coming from changes in the exchange rate and tariﬀs is to reduce the average intercept
by 15 percent (19 percent for CEOs in Column 2) and to increase the slope of contracts by 3
percentage points (3.4 percentage points for CEOs, or 15 percent of the baseline sensitivity).
The IV eﬀects are larger than the OLS results, which is what we would expect, given that
all the sources of bias mentioned would tend to attenuate the coeﬃcient. In the saturated
model (Columns 3 and 4) the point estimates are somewhat smaller, but not significantly
diﬀerent in statistical terms.
This is an important result: when firms face additional foreign competition, their pay
structure shifts towards more performance-related pay and less fixed pay. That is, compe-
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tition leads to an increase in incentives, and firms shift the components of pay in a way
that should induce executives to increase firm performance. This is true if we control for
individual fixed eﬀects as well as if we saturate the model with interactions of year and
industry dummies with performance. The use of instrumental variables deals with the
endogeneity concerns and allows us to confirm that the causality of this eﬀect goes from
foreign competition to pay, not the other way around.24
Beyond identifying the causal eﬀect in the IV regressions, and to have a sense of the
contribution of import penetration to the overall changes in executive compensation and
to the increase in performance pay sensitivities, we evaluated the total contribution of im-
port penetration to changing performance-pay sensitivities. In the simple OLS regressions,
adding import penetration as a further regressor explains 35% of the overall increase in
performance-pay sensitivities over this period.
4.2 Promotion and Wage ladders
Just as tying pay to performance can provide incentives for executives to exert eﬀort and
act in the interest of owners, so can the expectation of a promotion and its associated wage
increase after good performance. Conversely, the expectation of a potential demotion or
firing after poor performance can play the same role. In this section, we analyze how the
wage ladder —that is, the wage diﬀerentials between executives within a firm that reflect the
expected premium associated with a promotion— evolves with foreign competition.25
We evaluate changes in pay diﬀerentials between the executives of the firm in order
to measure whether, as foreign competition increases, executives can expect higher wage
increases from moving up the firm’s compensation hierarchy. To measure the changes in the
promotion ladder, we rank each executive within the firm according to salary and bonus in
a given year.26 We construct five dummy variables, hk with k ∈ {1, 2, .., 5}, where h1 takes
24We also tested the robustness of the results to the inclusion of a number of mechanisms, none of which
altered our results. Allowing for relative performance evaluation, and looking at firms with diﬀerent leverage,
made little diﬀerence. We also looked for diﬀerential eﬀects in firms with diﬀerent levels of anti-takeover
protection, or with large institutional investors, and found no systematic diﬀerences.
25We investigated whether higher foreign competition led to changes in the probability of a promo-
tion/demotion by studying internal rank mobility. Our regressions related the eﬀect of foreign competition
on the probability of an executive changing rank within the firm. We found no significant eﬀects, suggesting
that the probability did not change; and therefore, the change in incentives comes from changes in the level
of compensation associated with each level in the hierarchy, not from changes in promotion probabilities.
26Our data do not allow us to accurately identify whether diﬀerences in pay across executives are also
linked to diﬀerences in job title. That is why our measure of "hierarchy" reflects exclusively pay hierarchy .
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value 1 if the executive is the highest paid executive in the firm on a given year and zero
otherwise, h2 takes value 1 if the executive is the second highest paid executive in the firm
on that year, and so on up to h5. We then run regressions with the following specification.








bsXsifjt + dt + dj + ηi + ifjt (3)
where impfjt is import penetration, Xsifjt are control variables (firm size), and the rest
of variables are as described in Section 4.1. The coeﬃcients βk represent the average
wage diﬀerential between diﬀerent levels of executives. Given that the pay measure is
in logs, these diﬀerentials should be interpreted as ratios of the total pay of one executive
to another. Therefore they do not capture the fact that pay increased for all executives
during the period. The coeﬃcients of interest are θk, a measure of the change in these
diﬀerentials with competition. If the diﬀerence in pay between executives increases with
impfjt, we would expect to find that βk increases in k (in absolute value); this indicates
that the wage diﬀerentials are more marked with high foreign competition, conditional on
controls and unobserved heterogeneity. Notice that the inclusion of individual fixed eﬀects
in these regressions implies that the estimated diﬀerences between pay levels, βk, are not
attributable to the diﬀerent abilities of executives in the hierarchy. That is, if the highest
paid worker (k = 1) receives a higher wage than the others (reflected by βk < 0), it is
not because he or she is the most talented individual, because unobserved ability, that we
can think of as "talent", is accounted for in the fixed eﬀect. We present and discuss the
results with and without fixed eﬀects. Section 4.3 exploits information in the individual
fixed eﬀects about the "talent" of the executives that firms hire, and how this changes with
competition.
Table 5 shows the results of this specification. As dependent variables, we use both the
log of total compensation, which reflects overall diﬀerences in realized pay, and the log of
salary-plus-bonus. The latter may be a better measure of the promotion structure because
it is less a reflection of the eﬀort of the executive during year. The omitted category is
always the highest paid executive. Before studying the eﬀects of import penetration on
the wage diﬀerentials within the firm, we analyze the wage ladder itself (coeﬃcients of
variables second, third...). By construction, the coeﬃcients are all negative and increasing
in absolute value as one goes down the wage ladder. A comparison of Columns 1 and 3
(2 and 4 for total pay) also shows that the wage ladder is less steep when one controls
for individual unobserved heterogeneity. This indicates that one of the reasons for existing
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wage diﬀerentials among executives is that diﬀerent levels in the hierarchy are occupied by
workers with diﬀerent ability levels. However, ability (talent) is only part of the explanation,
since Columns 3 and 4 still show significant and sizable diﬀerences between the diﬀerent
levels. Therefore, "advancing in the pay hierarchy" is associated with a wage increase and
thus provides incentives (so long as promotion is tied to performance).
In regard to import penetration, the results on θ2 to θ5 show how imports aﬀect on
the diﬀerential between the executive layers, net of all characteristics that are controlled
for in Xifjt and individual unobserved heterogeneity. These results should not be driven
by the fact that individuals with diﬀerent ability occupy diﬀerent positions, but rather
by how much the firm pays for each position. The coeﬃcients are negative and generally
increasing in absolute value with respect to the import penetration measure. As import
penetration increases, the wage schedule becomes steeper, with the highest paid executive
earning proportionally more than the second highest paid executive, and so on, for all 5
categories.
Again, the eﬀect is sizeable: for the highest paid executive, a single standard deviation
increase in foreign competition generates a 2.25 percent increase in salary-plus-bonus and
a 1.8 increase in total pay (which includes fixed and variable pay). It also leads to an
additional wage diﬀerential —after controlling for ability in Columns 3 and 4— between the
highest and the fifth highest paid executive of 1.6 percent in salary-plus-bonus, and 1 percent
in total compensation (although the diﬀerence is not highly significant).
Comparing Columns 1 and 3 also shows that the increase in the top executive pay with
imports is slightly higher if we do not include individual fixed eﬀects (in Column 1). This
suggests that some of the increase in CEO pay is a result of firms in more competitive
industries hiring more skilled/talented CEOs. Frydman (2005) and Murphy et al. (2004)
argue that the increase in CEO pay reflects an increase in the demand for general skills.
Our results suggest that this increase in the demand for talent may arise from increased
foreign competition.
To assess the causal eﬀect of foreign competition, we use instrumental variables as before.
Columns 5 and 6 mirror the specifications in columns 3 and 4 (with imports instrumented)
and yield a similar pattern, although the magnitude of the eﬀects is larger throughout.
Salary-plus-bonus of the highest paid executive increases by 22 percent and the diﬀerence
in comparison to the fifth executive is 6 percent larger after a single standard deviation (2
percentage points) increase in import penetration (16 percent and 9 percent respectively
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for total compensation in Column 8). In these specifications, total pay for the lower ranked
executives actually falls.
In sum, these results indicate that the ratio of the total pay of an executive to the total
pay of the next lower paid executive grows with foreign competition. This leads to higher
rewards for an internal promotion, and is one way to provide incentives that complements
the increase in performance-pay sensitivities documented in the last section. The results
also complement those in the previous section in terms of the overall eﬀect on total pay of
changing compensation structures: total pay increases at the top of the ladder and falls for
lower ranked executives (Columns 7 and 8). This is related to the results in Revenga (1992),
Abowd and Lemieux (1992), and Abowd and Allain (1996), who analyze workers and find
a negative eﬀect on total pay of increasing foreign competition. We find that compensation
actually may increase for the very top executives; that this increase is partly a result of firms
hiring more highly skilled executives; and that total compensation falls more, the lower in
the hierarchy the executive is.27
4.3 Talent
The previous section suggested that changes in wage diﬀerentials were partly attributable
to firms hiring workers with diﬀerent talent (measured as the unobserved fixed component
of wages). Marin and Verdier (2003a and 2003b) argue that increased globalization and
international trade lead firms to demand more talent (to a "war for talent") as the market
becomes more competitive, and to the extent that talent is in limited supply. In this
section we evaluate empirically whether firms tend to attract more or less talented CEOs
and executives as import penetration increases. Of course, we cannot see how demand
changes, but only what the realization of talent is in the firm.
The previous section also showed that total pay for the CEO and the very top executives
within the sample goes up. As mentioned, Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Frydman (2005)
suggest that the increase in the level of CEO pay may be a result of increased demand for
managerial talent. This section complements their results to the extent that we provide
27To assess the channels through which competition operates, we also checked whether the eﬀect of imports
on pay sensitivities and on hierarchies was diﬀerent across firms with diﬀerent governance levels (as measured
by the presence of a large institutional investor, and by the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick index). The results
indicated that, if anything, the eﬀect is larger for low governance firms, suggesting there is a catch-up eﬀect
at work. However the diﬀerences were not statistically significant in most cases. Results are available upon
request.
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evidence here for changes in the observed distribution of talent at the top of the firm and
that we are able to systematically test whether competition is one reason for this increase
in the demand for managerial ability.
Finding good measures of executive talent is not straightforward; however, a fairly
good proxy for ability can be derived from the fixed-eﬀects regressions. The individual
fixed eﬀect in a panel regression captures any fixed unobserved component that is not
explicitly controlled for and that determines wages. The logarithm of total compensation
is determined by a set of observables (like performance, firm size, industry, etc.) and an
unobserved fixed component that the individual carries with him from one firm to another.
In the labor literature, this term is interpreted as unobserved ability. We call this ability,
or talent, interchangeably.
We first model compensation as:
ln(Wifjt) = α+ β1impfjt +
5X
k=1
βk2hk + β3 ln assetsfjt + dt + dj + ηi + ifjt (4)
where variables are defined as above. In particular, hk are dummies indicating the level
(k) in the hierarchy occupied by the worker. From this we estimate an individual fixed
eﬀect bηi. The fixed eﬀects are estimated on the full Execucomp sample, not just on the
restricted sample for which we have trade information.
Notice that this estimate does not include the fact that wages may be higher because
of higher import penetration, nor that workers receive diﬀerent wages at diﬀerent levels in
the hierarchy (hk) because of incentive eﬀects. Nor does it include firm size eﬀects, or any
aggregate trend in wages, or cross-industry diﬀerences in wages. The estimate bηi is net of
all those eﬀects. However, it will include things such as innate talent, ability, and education
(not explicitly controlled for and arguably constant over time for executives).28 Studyingbηi shows what type of workers firms hire over time. For instance, the bηi associated with the
the highest paid worker of a given firm (the talent of that executive) will change over time,
when he is replaced. So, we can define bηi1ft as the fixed eﬀect estimated for the highest
paid worker of firm f at time t. Similarly, one can define bηikft as the talent of each of the k
executives in the firm’s hierarchy. Thus, for each k we can estimate:
bηikft = λ+ γimpfjt + φf + uifjt (5)
28This regression does not include performance, given that if an individual with higher ability leads the
firm to perform better, we do not want to net this out of our ability estimate.
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where φf are firm fixed eﬀects. Here, the identification comes from firms who replace their
kth executive: that is, from the change in talent from one executive to his successor.
Table 6 presents the results of the talent regressions. Column 1 restricts the analysis to
the company CEO (k = CEO) and shows that as firms face more competition, they replace
their CEOs with more talented individuals. This is only identified through movers —firms
that change their CEO. The eﬀect is larger for the instrumented regression, shown in the
second panel.
Columns 2 to 6 show the results for each level of the hierarchy, k = 1 to 5. We find that
the highest paid executive hired has higher talent as imports increase29. As we go further
down the hierarchy, we find as shown in the non-instrumented regressions (panel 1), that
the change in talent of lower-ranked executives is smaller if anything, although there are no
significant coeﬃcients. In panel 2, when import penetration is instrumented, we show that
the talent of the highest ranked executive is higher; the talent of the second ranked executive
does not change significantly; and the talent of the third and fourth ranked executives
falls. All of these results are identified out of within-firm and hierarchical-level changes in
executive talent when a number of observables are netted out of the wage regressions.
In sum, we conclude that the distribution of talent within the firm changes, with firms
hiring more talented workers at the top as they face more competition. This is particularly
clear in the IV regressions, which arguably are identifying a causal eﬀect. Therefore, firms
not only try to elicit more eﬀort from workers through incentives (as shown in Sections
4.1 and 4.2) but also seem to attract more talented workers. These results are consistent
with the predictions of the model in Marin and Verdier (2003) and suggest that there may
be a war for talent playing out when markets are more globalized.30 Furthermore, from
an organizational perspective, the results suggest that talent matters "at the top". When
faced with competitive pressure, firms seem to want to ensure that the CEO and the top
executives are high performers, probably because their marginal contribution to the success
of the firm is much larger.
29The coeﬃcient is diﬀerent from that of CEOs because it is not always the case that the CEO is the
highest paid executive.
30 It also provides support for and complements the arguments in Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Fry-
dman (2005).
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4.4 Job Mobility: Turnover
Next we explore whether the probability of an executive exiting the firm is aﬀected by foreign
competition. We know from Huson et al. (2001), that since the 1970s, the hiring of outside
CEOs and forced CEO succession have increased. An increase in the probability of either
voluntary departures (through external promotion) or involuntary ones (through forced
retirement or firing) in principle should increase the incentives of the executive to exert
eﬀort and thus increase the performance of the firm. Since we have a panel of executives,
we can use survival analysis methods to analyze the eﬀect of foreign competition on the
probability of turnover. Using this type of estimation method is important, because the
probability that an individual exits the firm in a given period is not independent of how
long he has been in the firm. Therefore, we want to model the underlying time-dependence
(captured by the baseline hazard) and assess how foreign competition alters the probability
of exit.
Executives may exit the firm because they are fired, hired by a rival firm, or they retire.
The motivations behind each of these are clearly diﬀerent. Unfortunately, Execucomp
data are not well suited to a detailed analysis of this question because, even though they
contain a variable that reports why an executive leaves the firm, this information is not
very reliable. First, the set of reasons listed is not exhaustive (in particular, no executive
reports a firing); second, for most executives no reason is reported; finally, the incentives to
misreport the true motives are strong, given that Execucomp is eﬀectively a non-anonymous
dataset. Therefore, we are left with an indicator for exit from the firm, that groups all of
these reasons together and estimate whether job turnover in general changes with foreign
competition.
A second, more important limitation concerns the available information on entry. Exe-
cucomp only reports the date when the executive eﬀectively entered the firm for a subset
of observations. This poses two problems. First, for a large number of observations, we do
not know when the individual entered the firm; therefore, we do not know exactly when
these observations started being at risk of exiting. We simply observe when the individual
became one of the top 5 executives while the firm was in the sample. This left-censoring
leads us to drop those observations. Second, even for those who report an entry date, we
only observe individuals who survived until the moment they were included in the sample.
All those executives who entered and exited the firm before the firm entered the sample are
not observed (along with those who never made it to the top 5). Therefore, longer durations
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are more likely to appear in the sample, and this may be a source of selection bias. We deal
with this type of left-truncation in the estimation.
With the limitations of the data in mind, we first plot Kaplan-Meier survival functions
to see the eﬀect of high foreign competition on turnover patterns. Because we need entry
dates to do this, we restrict the sample to individuals who report their date of entry to
the firm. We classify individuals according to whether they are in industries with above
or below average levels of foreign competition.31 This is shown in Figure 2. The vertical
axis represents the probability of staying in the same firm after a given number of years
(represented in the horizontal axis). Figure 2 indicates that individuals in industries with
high foreign competition (above average import penetration) are more likely to exit the
firm (less likely to survive, their Kaplan-Meier survival function drops faster). Therefore,
turnover (exit from the firm) seems to be higher in high-foreign-competition industries.
However, when the sample is divided according to the predicted import penetration using
instrumental variables (Figure 3), the results are quite diﬀerent, and show a much more
similar survival pattern for both high and low predicted import penetration groups.
This graphical analysis does not allow us to control adequately for the structure of the
data (the left-truncation and the potential survivor bias), nor for other covariates that may
be correlated with imports and determine the exit probability. Table 7 shows the results of
the hazard estimation taking into account the right-censoring, left-truncation and discrete
nature of the data, and controlling for CEO status, firm performance and firm size (as the
logarithm of assets). We estimate a logistic hazard model with a baseline hazard defined as
the logarithm of duration time (ln(t))32 and restricting the analysis to the observations for
which we observe entry.
The analysis reveals that the probability of exit from the firm increases with import
penetration, but this is largely a result of exit probabilities and imports trending in the
same direction over time. Once we control for year dummies (Column 2), the significance of
the coeﬃcient in Column 1 disappears, although it is still positive. When using the predicted
value of imports (using our instruments) as a regressor (Columns 3 and 4) instead of the
actual value, we find no significant eﬀect of imports on the probability of exit. If anything,
31We define them relative to the industry average. Graphs using the deviation with respect to the overall
(economy wide) import penetration average were qualitatively similar. However, to avoid identifying the
results out of the cross-sectional variation in imports, we favored the industry-specific average.
32We model the baseline hazard as ln(t). The results were basically identical when using a non-parametric
baseline, but we lost many observations because of the inclusion of dummies.
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this is negative (not significant) in Column 4 with controls for year dummies. We do find in
all of the specifications that higher performance reduces the probability of exiting the firm
and that executives in large corporations are more mobile. Further, CEOs also have a lower
probability of exit. However, since our measure does not distinguish between voluntary and
involuntary exits, it is hard to draw conclusions beyond these general descriptive results.
Overall, the results do not suggest a strong relationship between turnover and competi-
tion: turnover is positively related to increases in import penetration, but this seems to be
the result of a secular trend rather than a response to the exogenous changes induced by
exchange rates and tariﬀs. One possible explanation for this eﬀect is that firms decide to
change their CEOs when they expect increases in competition, but are reluctant to do so
once competition has already increased and the firm is under stress. However, with these
data and results, there is little more we can say other than to point to weak a correlation
between turnover and foreign competition.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we identify the eﬀects of foreign competition on diﬀerent aspects of executive
pay and the provision of incentives within the firm. Eliciting the empirical interaction
between competition and the provision of incentives is particularly important, as the existing
theoretical predictions are largely ambiguous.
Our results show that increases in foreign competition are associated with lower levels
of fixed pay and a higher sensitivity of pay to performance. Furthermore, and in contrast to
the literature relative to foreign competition and general wages, we do not find a consistent
decrease in total pay across all executives associated with more competition. Instead, we
observe that the wage ladder of the firm becomes steeper with more competition; that is,
the highest paid executives in the firm tend to earn proportionally more when competition
is high, while the lower layers of executives earn less as competition increases. All of
these results indicate that the incentives that the firm provides to executives to improve
the performance of the firm increase with foreign competition. We also show that higher
foreign competition leads to a higher demand for talent, especially at the very top layers of
the firm hierarchy and in particular for the CEO. Finally, we find some evidence that the
probability of exiting the firm (either through an external promotion, because the executive
gets fired or for any other reason) increases with foreign competition. This is likely to
induce executives to work harder, particularly in connection with the increased span of
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wage schedules. However, this last eﬀect seems to be related only to changes in expected
competition; no causal eﬀect of competition on turnover beyond the initial correlation can
be convincingly established.
The fact that we find a causal eﬀect of foreign competition —measured in a very precise
way and instrumented— on incentive provision across a number of diﬀerent incentive mecha-
nisms lends credibility to the idea that firms faced with more competition increase incentive
provision. Our results also provide a causal explanation for the observed changes in the
levels of compensation, and show that part of the relative increase in compensation of CEOs
with respect to other executives is attributable to an increased demand for managerial tal-
ent. There are certainly other reasons why compensation structures may have changed over
time. We established that one important contributor is the extent of import penetration
and the implied increase in product-market competition. Developing our understanding of
these mechanisms further is left to future research.
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A panel that records information on at least the top 5 executives of the firms included in
the S&P1500 index from 1992 onwards. We concentrate on the firms in industries for which
we have import penetration (the manufacturing sector in 1992-1999). We also restrict the
sample to the top five executives of each firm (ranked by salary-plus-bonus) and drop the
observations where there is no information on total pay received by the executive. This
leaves 17,178 executive-year observations.
Trade Data:
Import Penetration: Import penetration is defined at the industry level at 4 digit SIC
as the ratio of imports over imports plus domestic production in that year. We take the
average of contemporary and one year forward lag import penetration by industry. This
is demeaned at the industry level. For each firm, we construct weights that correspond
to the fraction of sales associated to each industry (business segment in Compustat) in
which it operated in 1991. The final import penetration measure is the weighted average
of all manufacturing industries in which the firm operates in 1991 .Since the industries the
firm operates in may change endogenously over time, the weights used correspond to the
firm’s operations in 1991. (Source: NBER database "US Imports, Exports and Tariﬀ Data,
1989-2001 (NBER 9387)" and Compustat Segments data)
Tariﬀs: The average tariﬀ measure is defined as the weighted average of the tariﬀs
imposed by the US on imports to each country, where the weights are the fraction of
imports coming from each country in 1993. (Source: UNCTAD TRAINS dataset)
Exchange rates: The exchange rate index is defined as in Bertrand (2004) at the industry
level (3 digit SIC code) as the weighted average of the log real exchange rates of importing
countries (expressed in foreign currency per dollar), where the weights are the share of each
foreign country’s import on total imports in a base period (1990- 1991). Real exchange
rates are nominal exchange rates multiplied by US Consumer Price Index and divided by
the trading partner CPI. Nominal exchange rates and foreign CPIs are obtained from the
International Financial Statistics of the IMF.
Tariﬀs and exchange rates are also weighted to obtain the firm specific measure.
All the trade information is obtained from the NBER database "US Imports, Exports
and Tariﬀ Data, 1989-2001 (NBER 9387)". The tariﬀ information is from UNCTAD
TRAINS dataset and the information on domestic production is from Census Bureau’s
Annual Survey of Manufactures (Statistics for Industry Groups and Industries) provided by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Duration Analysis:
To construct employment durations and transitions, we exploit the panel. Each exec-
utive has a unique identifier (variable EXECID) that allows us to follow him over time,
provided job changes occur within the Execucomp sample. We identify as firm transitions:
-observations where the firm reports that the executive left the sample in that particular
year (variable leftco).
-transitions in which we observe the individual in a firm one year and in another firm
the year after (coded as exit from the firm);
-transitions in which we observe the individual in a firm one year and not the following
year, although the firm remains in the sample (the individual may have moved to a firm
outside the sample).
All other spells are considered as censored. In particular, if the firm exits the sample
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we consider all executive observations in that firm as censored on the year the firm exits
the sample.
We also need to restrict the sample to those individuals for whom an entry date into
the firm is reported because of the left-truncation problem.
7 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean S.D. 0.25 Mdn 0.75 N
Ln total pay 6.96 0.95 6.28 7.00 11.92 23796
Ln salary + bonus 6.35 0.74 5.83 6.40 6.86 23793
Ln Performance 7.45 1.76 6.09 7.37 8.64 23796
Import pen.(demeaned) 0.00 0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.03 23796
Import pen *Ln performance -0.01 0.13 -0.09 -0.03 0.03 23796
Ln assets 7.27 1.88 5.85 7.23 8.62 23796
CEO 0.27 0.45 0 0 0 23796
Exchange rate 1.96 0.73 1.46 1.98 2.56 23796
Tariﬀs (lag) 3.14 4.83 0.89 2.66 4.27 13293
Notes: Total pay is total yearly compensation that includes salary, bonus, total
value of stock options granted (valued using the standard Black-Scholes formula),
total value of restricted stock granted, long-term incentive payouts and other
annual compensation; Performance is the natural logarithm shareholders value
at fiscal year end (in $1000) ; Import Penetration is Imports divided by Imports
plus domestic production at 4 digit SIC, the variable at t is the average of its
value t and t+1 and is demeaned with respect to the industry average; Log assets
measures firm size; CEO is an indicator for who is the company CEO; Exchange
rate is the weighted average of the log real exchange rates of importing countries
(expressed in foreign currency per dollar), where the weights are the share of
each foreign country’s import on total imports in a base period (1990- 1991);
Tariﬀ is the weighted average of tariﬀs paid by importers where the weights are
the importance of each country’s imports in the base year. Weights are firm
specific and measured by the fraction of sales in each of the firm’s segments in
1991. See data appendix for further details and sources.
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Table 2: First stage
Import Pen. Import Pen. Import Pen.*Perf Export Open.
1 2 3 4
Exchange Rate -0.004 -0.005 0.114*** 0.002
[0.003] [0.006] [0.033] [0.018]
Lagged Exchange Rate -0.029*** -0.011 -0.274*** 0.022
[0.008] [0.009] [0.061] [0.048]
Lagged Tariﬀs -0.0002*** -0.002*** -0.006** -0.002*
[0.000] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001]
Performance 0.007*** 0.061***
[0.002] [0.015]
Exchange Rate * Performance 0 -0.019***
[0.001] [0.005]
Lagged Exch. Rate * Performance -0.003*** 0.007
[0.001] [0.008]
Lagged Tariﬀs*Performance 0.000*** 0.001*
[0.000] [0.000]
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes
Indiv. Fixed Eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Observations 18251 18251 18251 13313
R-squared 0.282 0.288 0.303 0.022
R squared excl. IV 0.08 0.09 0.11
Joint significance of IV (F-stat) 101.3 45.92 54.26
Hansen Overid test P-value 0.098 0.469 0.469
Robust standard errors in brackets clustered by firm-year
* significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
Notes: This are the first stage regressions for the main endogenous variables instrumented in
sections 4.1 (Column 1) and 2 (Columns 2 and 3). The dependent variable is Import penetration
in columns 1, 2 and 4, and Import penetration times performance in column 3. All regressions
include the explanatory variables of the second stage in addition to the variables and instruments
reported on the table. Import penetration is imports divided by Imports plus domestic produc-
tion at 4 digit SIC, the variable associated to period t is the average of the ratio in period t and
period t+1, the variable is demeaned with respect to the industry average; Performance is the
natural logarithm of shareholders value at fiscal year end; Exchange rate is the weighted average
of the log real exchange rates of importing countries (expressed in foreign currency per dollar),
where the weights are the share of each foreign country’s import on total imports in a base period
(1990- 1991); the weights correspond to the primary sector of the firm in columns 1 and 2 and
to the weighted average of all the segments of the firm according to their relative importance
in 1991. Tariﬀ is the weighted average of duties imposed on imports, where the weights are the
fraction of imprts form each trading country in that industry in a base year. See data appendix
for further details and sources.
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Table 3: Pay Structure: Performance-related-pay
Total comp. Total comp. Stayers Total comp.+trends CEOs CEOs+trends
1 2 3 4 5 6
Performance 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.24*** -1.61*** 0.32*** -0.39
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.18] [0.02] [2.09]
Import Pen. -4.78*** -6.61*** -5.74*** -4.19** -6.54*** -3.79
[1.57] [1.78] [1.79] [1.93] [2.28] [2.91]
Import Pen.*Mk.Ret. 0.80*** 0.98*** 0.86*** 0.63** 1.04*** 0.73*
[0.23] [0.26] [0.26] [0.29] [0.31] [0.41]
Ln Assets 0.19*** 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.06* 0.05
[0.01] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04]
CEO 0.85*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.25***





Year + Ind. Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Indiv Fixed Eﬀects no yes yes yes yes yes
Indust.dummies*Perf. no no no no no yes
Year dummies*Perf. no no no no no yes
Observations 23222 23222 23222 23222 4157 4157
R-squared 0.6 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.82 0.84
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by firm-year
* significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
Notes: The dependent variable, is the log of total yearly compensation that includes salary, bonus, total value of
stock options granted (valued using the standard Black-Scholes formula), total value of restricted stock granted,
long-term incentive payouts and other annual compensation; Performance is the natural logarithm shareholders
value at fiscal year end ; Import Penetration is Imports divided by Imports plus domestic production at 4 digit
SIC, the variable is the average of the contemporaneous ratio and a forward lag and iis demeaned with respect
to the industry average; Log assets measures firm size; CEO is an indicator for who is the company CEO. See
data appendix for further details and sources.
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Table 4: Pay Structure: IV Results
All CEOs All CEOs
1 2 3 4
Performance 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.15*** 0.20***
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.05]
Import Pen. -14.59*** -19.41*** -16.28*** -22.89***
[4.77] [6.74] [4.39] [7.48]
Import Pen.*Mk.Ret. 3.04*** 3.41*** 3.00*** 3.97***
[0.64] [0.89] [0.60] [1.04]
Ln Assets 0.12*** 0.09* 0.11*** 0.10**
[0.03] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05]
CEO 0.28*** 0.28***
[0.02] [0.02]
Year + Ind. Dummies yes yes yes yes
Indiv Fixed Eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Indust.dummies*Perf. no no yes yes
Year dummies*Perf. no no yes yes
Observations 18251 3531 18251 3531
R squared 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.22
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
Notes: These are two stage least squares regressions of table 3 where Import Pen-
etration and its interaction with Performance are instrumented with exchange
rates and tariﬀs (see table 2 for the firs stage result). The dependent variable,
is the log of total yearly compensation that includes salary, bonus, total value of
stock options granted (valued using the standard Black-Scholes formula), total
value of restricted stock granted, long-term incentive payouts and other annual
compensation; Performance is the natural logarithm shareholders value at fiscal
year end ; Import Penetration is Imports divided by Imports plus domestic pro-
duction at 4 digit SIC, the variable is the mean of the contemporaneous ratio and
one forward lag, and it is demeaned with respect to the industry average; Log
assets measures firm size; CEO is an indicator for who is the company CEO. See
data appendix for further details and sources.
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Table 5: Promotion and Wage Ladders
Sal.+Bonus Total Pay Sal+Bonus Total comp. Total comp. Total comp.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Import Pen. 2.25*** 1.83*** 2.20*** 1.39** 11.06* 8.87**
[0.37] [0.60] [0.44] [0.62] [6.03] [4.14]
Second*Imp.Pen. -0.58** -1.62*** -0.81** -1.39** -0.77 -2.77*
[0.25] [0.44] [0.40] [0.56] [1.72] [1.55]
Third*Imp.Pen -0.69*** -1.62*** -1.00** -1.06* -4.73*** -3.87**
[0.25] [0.46] [0.41] [0.55] [1.59] [1.75]
Fourth*Imp.Pen. -1.00*** -1.10** -1.03** -1.29** -2.11 -2.66
[0.30] [0.48] [0.42] [0.60] [1.74] [1.94]
Fifth*Imp.Pen. -1.34*** -0.79 -1.66*** -1.01 -3.00* -4.50**
[0.44] [0.53] [0.61] [0.66] [1.71] [1.90]
Second -0.49*** -0.53*** -0.35*** -0.24*** -0.54*** -0.20***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Third -0.73*** -0.81*** -0.50*** -0.35*** -0.79*** -0.28***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
Fourth -0.88*** -0.97*** -0.61*** -0.43*** -0.97*** -0.37***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
Fifth -1.02*** -1.11*** -0.70*** -0.49*** -1.09*** -0.42***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.04] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
Year+Industdummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Indiv. Fixed eﬀects no no yes yes no yes
IV no no no no yes yes
Observations 23217 23222 23217 23222 18251 18251
R-squared 0.7 0.64 0.88 0.84 0.63 0.67
Robust standard errors in brackets clustered by firm-year
* significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
Notes: The dependent variable Total Comp., is the log of total yearly compensation that includes salary, bonus, total
value of stock options granted (valued using the standard Black-Scholes formula), total value of restricted stock granted,
long-term incentive payouts and other annual compensation; Sal+bon. is the logarithm of salary plus bonus; Second is a
dummy that records the second most highly paid executive, third is the third most highly paid etc. The base category is the
most highly paid executive in the firm. Import Penetration is Imports divided by Imports plus domestic production at 4
digit SIC, the variable is demeaned with respect to the industry average; Log assets measures firm size; CEO is an indicator
for who is the company CEO. Column 3 has industry specific individual fixed eﬀects. Columns 4 and 5 are two stage least
squares regressions of table 3 where Import Penetration and its interaction with the hierarchy dummies are instrumented
with exchange rates and tariﬀs (see table 2 for the first stage results). See data appendix for further details and sources.
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Table 6: Talent regressions
Non Instrumented
CEO 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1 2 3 4 5
Import Pen. 0.09 0.492*** -0.415* -0.869*** -0.512**
[0.21] [0.189] [0.227] [0.211] [0.227]
Observations 4157 4876 4851 4780 4578
Instrumented
CEO 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1 2 3 4 5
Import Pen. 0.31 0.694 0.119 -1.858*** -0.714
[0.51] [0.499] [0.640] [0.594] [0.614]
Observations 3531 3767 3752 3713 3613
Firms 715 730 730 725 715
Firm fixed eﬀects in all regressions
* significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
Notes: The dependent variable is the estimated fixed eﬀect from a first
stage regression of log of total pay on firm size, hierarchy, year and indus-
try dummies. Import Penetration is defined as in Table 1. Each column
represents a diﬀerent layer of the firm hierarchy.
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Table 7: Survival Analysis: Probability of exit from the firm
Pr. exit Pr. exit Pr. exit Pr. exit
1 2 3 4
Import Pen. 5.36*** 0.71 2.22 -1.96
[1.77] [1.65] [2.13] [1.82]
ceo -1.08*** -1.07*** -1.08*** -1.07***
[0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10]
Performance -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.20***
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
ln(assets) 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Baseline Hazard: ln(t) 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Year dummies no yes no yes
Instrimented imp.pen. no no yes yes
Observations 6193 6146 6193 6146
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
Notes: Estimates a logistic hazard model of the probability of exiting
the firm. The baseline hazard is defined as the logarithm of spell
duration and ll other variables are defined as in table 1. Columns 3
and 4 use predicted import penetration using our instruments instead
of the raw value in Columns 1 and 2. See data appendix for further
details and sources.
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year
2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations 3674 Semiconductors
3714 Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories
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